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Fairness and Redistribution: Comment†
By Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra*
In an influential paper, Alesina and Angeletos (2005)—henceforth, AA—argued 
that a preference for fairness could lead two identical societies to choose different 
economic systems. In particular, two equilibria might arise: one with low taxes and 
a belief that the income-generating process is “fair” because effort is important (an 
“American” equilibrium) and another with high taxes and the belief that the process 
is “unfair” because luck prevails. Piketty (1995) had shown that a similar pattern 
could arise from standard preferences if initial beliefs about the relative importance 
of effort and luck in generating income differed across the two societies, while 
Benabou and Tirole (2006) study this issue using more realistic preferences (Buera, 
Monge-Naranjo, and Primiceri 2011 discuss the evolution of beliefs about economic 
systems). A key contribution of AA is to obtain these two equilibria from identical 
societies assuming agents prefer outcomes that are fair, an important modification 
because fairness considerations seem central in the demand for redistribution, and 
because in several settings (as in some ultimatum games) such preferences for fair-
ness can lead to large (material) inefficiencies.
In this note we report a difficulty we encountered when interpreting the results 
in AA: we find multiplicity (and demand for redistribution) even if luck plays no 
role. In other words, there is multiplicity even if the equilibrium tax rate is inde-
pendent of the signal-to-noise ratio (a quantity that expresses how important effort 
is, relative to luck, in the determination of income). This conflicts with the notion 
that the signal-to-noise ratio plays a central role in generating multiplicity with AA 
preferences for fairness.
I. The AA Model
The economy is populated by a measure 1 continuum of individuals i ∈ [0, 1], 
who live for two periods: in the first period the individuals accumulate capital; in the 
middle of their lives the taxes are set; in the second period, individuals exert effort 
(work). Total pretax lifetime income is
(1)  y i =  A i [α  k i + (1 − α)  e i ] +  η i ,
where A is talent, k is the capital accumulated during the first period, e is effort 
during the second period, η is “noise” or “luck”, and α ∈ (0, 1) is a technological 
constant. The government imposes a flat tax rate τ on income and redistributes the 
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proceeds in a lump sum fashion, so that the individual’s consumption is, for govern-
ment transfer G = τ  ∫
i
   y i ,
  c i = (1 − τ)  y i + G.
Individual preferences are, for  u i =  V i ( c i ,  k i ,  e i ) =  c i −  1 _ 2 β i   [α  k i 2 + (1 − α)  e i 2 ],
  U i ≡  u i − γ Ω ≡  c i −  1 _ 2 β i  [α  k i 2 + (1 − α)  e i 2 ] − γ Ω ,
where  u i is private utility from own consumption, investment and effort,  β i is an 
impatience parameter, γ is “distaste for unfair outcomes,” and Ω is a measure of the 
social injustice in the economy. AA assume that A, η, and β are i.i.d. across agents, 
and that for δ =  A 2 β, Cov(δ, η) = 0. We let  _ δ be the mean of δ, and  δ m its median; 
AA also assume Δ =  _ δ −  δ m ≥ 0 and normalize  δ m = 2. Similarly,  _ η is the mean of η and  η m its median.
AA define social injustice as Ω =  ∫
i
   ( u i −   ui ) 2 , where  u i is the actual level 
of private utility, and   ui is a measure of the “fair” level of utility the individ-
ual should have (deserves) on the basis of his talent and effort. They define 
  ui =  V i (  ci ,  k i ,  e i ) for
(2)   ci =   yi =  A i [α  k i + (1 − α)  e i ].
The individual chooses k when taxes haven’t been set, so anticipating a tax rate of 
τ e (which will be equal to the actual τ in equilibrium), he maximizes
(3)  u i = (1 −  τ e )  A i [α  k i + (1 − α)  e i ] + (1 −  τ e )  η i + G −  1 _ 2  β i  [α  k i 2 + (1 − α)  e i 2 ]
with respect to k, and using the actual tax rate in equation (3) maximizes with respect 
to e to obtain
(4)   k i = (1 −  τ e )  A i  β i and  e i = (1 − τ)  A i  β i .
Then,  U i =  u i − γ Ω implies
  U i (τ,  τ e ) =   δ i  _ 2 (1 − α  τ e 2 − (1 − α)  τ 2 ) +  η i + τ ( _ η −  η i ) 
 + τ ( _ δ −  δ i )[1 − α  τ e − τ (1 − α)] − γ (( 1 − τ) 2  σ η 2
 +  τ 2  [1 − α  τ e − (1 − α) τ] 2  σ δ 2).
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A. Example: Multiplicity without Luck
AA say:
The critical features of the model that generate equilibrium multiplicity 
are (a) that the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the signal-to-noise ratio 
and (b) that the equilibrium signal-to-noise ratio is in turn decreasing in 
the tax rate (p. 970).
We now present an example with no noise, no luck, and therefore a constant noise-
to-signal ratio, that still has multiple equilibria.
Set  δ m = 2,  _ δ =  47 _ 20 ,  _ η =  η m = 0, γ σ δ 2 =  27 _ 25 , α =  999 _ 1,000 , and  σ η 2 = 0. We first 
note that  
d  U m ( τ e ,  τ e ) _
d τ  = 0 has three solutions for  τ e h ≈ 0.99308,  τ e m ≈ 0.8029, and τ e l ≈ 0.2031. The existence of three roots in [0, 1] follows from Bolzano’s Theorem 
and (d  U m ( 1 _ 5 ,  1 _ 5 )/d τ, d  U m ( 9 _ 10 ,  9 _ 10 )/d τ) > 0 > (d  U m ( 1 _ 2 ,  1 _ 2 )/d τ, d  U m (1, 1)/dτ).
This means, in principle, but we will now check it, that given an expected tax 
rate of  τ e j for j = l, m, h, the tax rate that maximizes the utility of the voter with the 
median values of the shocks is  τ e j ; that is, there is multiplicity of equilibria, even 
though luck plays no role.
We now check that given a tax rate of  τ e l the tax rate that maximizes the utility 
of the individual with the median values of the shocks is again τ =  τ e l (the cases 
of  τ e m and  τ e h are similar and omitted). First note that the optimal tax rates for 
 τ e l are neither 0 nor 1, since  U m (1,  20,302 _100,000  ) <  U m (0,  20,302 _100,000  ) <  U m ( 20,302 _100,000  ,  20,302 _100,000  ), 
and continuity of  U m (τ,  τ e ) in  τ e implies that for  τ e l close to  20,302 _100,000  we still have 
U m (1,  τ e l ) <  U m (0,  τ e l ) <  U m ( τ e l ,  τ e l ). Therefore, the tax τ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes 
 U m (τ,  τ e l ) must solve dU(τ,  τ e l )/d τ = 0. We know that d U( τ e l ,  τ e l )/d τ = 0 (by defini-
tion of  τ e l ), so we only need to check that it is the global maximum among τ ∈ [0, 1] 
which is ensured by concavity in the domain:  d 2 U m (τ,  τ e l )/d (  τ  2 ) ≈ −1.296 × 
1 0 −5  τ  2 + 1.0331 × 1 0 −2 τ − 1.3781 < 0 (for all τ ∈ [0, 1]).
B. Discussion
Note that with no luck in the model,  σ η 2 = 0, for  τ e = τ we obtain that for  σ   y 2
the variance of “fair” income (the signal in AA), Ω =  τ 2 σ   y 2 =  σ δ 2  τ 2 ( 1 − τ) 2 , which 
is nonmonotonic in τ, while one might expect unfairness to increase with taxes.1 
Hence, it is possible that the key insights in AA can be restored if other definitions 
of what is fair are used. For example, one alternative definition involves keeping 
taxes in the definition of fair consumption (in AA “fair” consumption involves no 
taxes and no luck).2 Alesina and Cozzi (2012) analyze multiplicity using another 
1 Thus, a tax rate of τ = 1 also minimizes unfairness Ω, which seems counterintuitive since there is no luck in 
this economy. Moreover, one difficulty in evaluating the claim that the tax rate that minimizes Ω depends on the 
signal-to-noise ratio is that the signal also appears to depend on the tax.
2 Di Tella, Dubra, and MacCulloch (2010) take this approach (see also the comment by Angeletos 2010). 
Alesina, Cozzi, and Mantovan (2009) study the dynamic implications of both types of preferences and note that 
the definition of fairness in AA is not only about fairness, but reflects instead that individuals “tolerate inequality 
coming from innate ability and effort, but are averse to inequality arising from everything else, luck, and redistribu-
tion” (p. 5).
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approach where the AA preferences are normalized by average income. Another 
possibility would be to insist that the effort imputed in “fair” consumption takes 
into account that there are no taxes. In other words, it may be more reasonable to 
modify AA so that the  k i and  e i used to substitute into   yi in equation (2), are not 
those associated to the case where taxes may be positive. Finally, one may also 
insist on preferences for fairness that are consistent with the empirical evidence. For 
example, Levine (1998) and Rotemberg (2008) demonstrate that preferences for 
“reciprocal altruism” are consistent with the available evidence from the ultimatum 
games, while Di Tella and Dubra (2010) show that they lead to multiplicity in an 
economy similar to that presented in AA.
One difficulty for exploring these conjectures in the AA framework is that a 
counterexample to the main theorem can be produced because AA claim that the 
individual with the median values of the shocks is the median voter, but in general 
he is not. In the online Appendix we give an example where the equilibrium tax 
rate, the one preferred by the median voter, is not the one identified in AA. The 
tax rate identified as the equilibrium in AA would be defeated in voting by the 
one preferred by the median voter (which can be shown to be a Condorcet winner, 
even if the median voter theorem does not apply). This wedge between the predic-
tion of the AA model and what would happen in that economy is relevant, since 
it is currently not known if in the AA model multiplicity can arise when the equi-
librium tax rate is one that, when anticipated, maximizes the utility of the median 
voter (in one special case, when  _ δ =  δ m , Di Tella, Dubra, and MacCulloch 2010 
show how to analyze the AA model, establishing that the median voter’s preferred 
tax rate is a Condorcet winner. But this case is not very relevant empirically, since 
it implies mean income equal to median income, and does not allow for a Meltzer-
Richard effect.).3
In brief, we believe that the main point in AA, namely, that a preference for fair-
ness can lead to multiple equilibria, is potentially valid but some aspects of the 
particular framework they propose need to be revised.
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